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352 37 /" . Abstract / 
Some of the more s ignif icant  accimplishments 
of recent years re la t ing  t o  the improvement of 
instruments, the measurement and compensation of 
the  errors  of static-pressure systems, and the col- 
l e c t f l i n f b o n  on the  f l i g h t  technical 
e r ror  a re  reviewed. Previous studies of t he  re la -  
t ion  between alt imetry errors  and ve r t i ca l  separa- 
t i on  standards a re  discussed and the  problem of 
assessing ve r t i ca l  separation standards i s  examined 
from an approach different  from tha t  used i n  those 
studies. On the  basis  of t he  present review, the  
need fo r  fur ther  work i s  indicated fo r  standard- 
iz ing the cal ibrat ions of static-pressure systems, 
fo r  col lect ing additional information on the  f l i gh t  
technical e r ror ,  fo r  developing an a l t i tude-  
deviation monitoring and warning device, and fo r  
improving the maintenance pract ices  re la t ing  t o  the 
tes t ing  and ins ta l la t ion  of the instruments. 
/ 
,J' 
Introduction m E  
A knowledge of the alt imetry errors  tha t  
ermine the degree t o  which a i r c ra f t  adhere t o  
t h e i r  assigned a l t i tudes  i s  needed fo r  assessments 
of the  adequacy of ve r t i ca l  separation standards. 
For cruise  or  holding f l i gh t ,  the  extent t o  which 
an airplane deviates from i t s  assigned a l t i t ude  
depends on the system error  (combined instrunment 
and static-pressure errors)  and on the f l i gh t  tech- 
n i ca l  e r ror  (random deviations of the airplane from 
i ts  cruise f l i g h t  level) .  See f igure 1. 
' For a great  many years extensive e f for t s  have 
been made by manufacturers, operators, and govern- 
ment agencies t o  improve the accuracy of instru-  
ments and static-pressure systems and t o  col lect  
data on the  f l i g h t  technical  error .  I n  addition, 
ana ly t ica l  s tudies  have been conducted by several  
organizations - notably ICAO (Internat ional  Civ i l  
Aviation Organization) and UTA (Internat ional  A i r  
Transport Association) - t o  estimate the alt imetry 
e r ror  (combined system and f l i g h t  technical errors)  
fo r  an evaluation of ve r t i ca l  separation standards 
( r e f s .  1 t o  4). 
In the  present paper, some of the  more impor- 
t an t  developments re la t ing  t o  the  instrument, 
s ta t ic-pressure and f l i gh t  technical  errors  will be 
reviewed and the  problem of assessing separation 
standards w i l l  be examined by an approach different  
from tha t  used i n  other studies. 
Glossary of Terms 
Instrument e r ro r  - s t a t i s t i c a l  sum of the e r rors  
due t o  the  mechanical imperfection of the  altim- 
e t e r  (i.e., scale  o r  diaphragm, hysteresis,  drift, 
f r i c t ion ,  temperature, i n s t ab i l i t y ,  and backlash) 
and the e r ro r s  due t o  readabi l i ty  (a l t i tude  and 
barometric -set t ing scales ) . 
Static-pressure e r ror  - the  difference between 
free-stream s t a t i c  pressure and the  pressure reg- 
i s t e r ed  by the a i r c r a f t  static-pressure source 
(static-pressure tube or  fuselage vent); fo r  a 
given airplane,  the s t a t i s t i c a l  sum of the fixed 
e r ror  ( the  e r ror  applicable t o  the  a i r c ra f t  type) 
and the  variable e r ror  ( the probable departure of 
the  ac tua l  e r ror  from the  fixed e r ror ) .  
Flight technical e r ror  - random deviations of an 
airplane from i t s  cruise f l i gh t  level .  
System er ror  - s t a t i s t i c a l  sum of the  instrument 
e r ror  and the static-pressure error .  
Altimetry error  - s t a t i s t i c a l  sum of the  system 
er ror  and the f l i gh t  technical error .  
a - standard deviation of an error .  
30 - probable maximum value of an error  or the  
value having a probabili ty of 99.7 percent. 
- 
-
Instrument Errors 
Significant reductions i n  the instrument 
errors have been achieved through improvements i n  
the design of the  instruments and the t e s t  equip- 
ment used t o  cal ibrate  the instruments. 
Improved instrument design l ed  t o  the  develop- 
ment of the  "precision" alt imeter ( re fs .  5 and 6)  
having low hysteresis  and a high degree of repeat- 
ab i l i t y  ( r e f .  7 )  and, i n  addition, scale (or dia- 
phragm) errors  which a re  l e s s  than one-half those 
of the  older "sensit ive" a l t imeter  ( re fs .  8 and 9). 
Further reductions i n  the scale e r rors  of the pre- 
cision al t imeter  have been made possible by the  
development scale-error correction devices 
( re f .  10). 
the instruments have been improved, the  instrument 
error  of a precision alt imeter with scale-error 
correction was estimated i n  reference 1 t o  be 
132 f e e t  a t  40,000 f ee t  as compared t o  663 f e e t  f o r  
the sensi t ive al t imeter  without scale-error correc- 
tion. Note that these f igures  a re  Ja values 
where Q i s  the  standard deviation of the errors .  
A s  an indication of the  extent t o  which 
Improvements i n  the  cal ibrat ion t e s t  equipment 
have produced a var ie ty  of precision barometers and 
manometers that permit cal ibrat ions t o  be performed 
to  an accuracy of 0.005 inch of mercury or 5 f ee t  
a t  sea l eve l  ( re fs .  ll and E). 
t es t ing  and adjustment of alt imeters,  however, this 
accuracy i s  not always real ized i n  practice.  
recent survey of t e s t  equipment in control towers 
and instrument repair  shops, for  example, it was 
found that many control towers work t o  a tolerance 
of only 0.02 inch of mercury and tha t  only 7 of the 
37 barometers t e s t ed  i n  the repair  shops conformed 
to  a tolerance of 0.005 inch of mercury ( r e f .  13). 
This survey a l so  disclosed other deficiences i n  the 
For the  routine 
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t e s t  equipment and a lack of standardization i n  the 
laboratory t e s t  procedures. In two surveys of 
scale-error tolerances and in s t a l l a t ion  e r rors  of 
alt imeters i n  operational use, deficiencies re la t ing  
t o  the  ins ta l la t ion  and maintenance of the ins t ru-  
ments were also uncovered ( r e f s .  14 and 15). On 
the  bas i s  of these surveys, it would appear t ha t  
further efforts a r e  required t o  bring the competence 
leve l  of instrument maintenance practices up t o  tha t  
which has been achieved i n  the  development of the  
instruments and t e s t  equipment. 
Static-Pressure Errors 
The static-pressure e r ror  of an airplane i s  
considered by ICAO and UTA as  comprising a fixed 
error ( the  error applying t o  the a i r c r a f t  type) and 
a variable error ( the  probable departure of the  
actual e r ror  of t he  airplane from the fixed e r ro r ) .  
The variable error i s  considered t o  be a composite 
e r ror  t ha t  results from differences i n  the  e r rors  
among a i r c ra f t  of a type, the  errors of the calibra- 
t i on  procedure, and the  change i n  the e r ror  during 
the service l i f e  of the  airplane. 
The Fixed E r r o r  
For a given a i r c r a f t  configuration, the  magni- 
tude of the fixed e r ror  depends on the design and 
location of the static-pressure sensor (fuselage 
vent o r  boom-mounted static-pressure tube) and on 
Mach number and angle of attack. For fixed errors 
exceeding 50 feet ,  both ICAO and IATA recommend 
tha t  corrections be applied. I f  the corrections are 
applied with calibration cards, the residual e r ror  
i s  estimated t o  be 15 f ee t  f o r  piston-engine a i r -  
c r a f t  and 50 feet for  j e t  a i r c ra f t ;  i f  the correc- 
t ions  a re  applied by servo-correction devices, the 
residual error i s  given as 15 f ee t  ( r e f s .  1 and 2).  
However, i n  view of the specified accuracy of 
present-day a i r  data compensators ( i  . e. , 0.2 percent 
of the a l t i tude  or,  fo r  example, 80 f ee t  a t  
k1,000 f ee t  - ref.  16), the 15-foot value given i n  
references 1 and 2 would appear t o  be overly 
optimistic. 
For operations i n  the lower subsonic speed 
range, the magnitude of the fixed e r ror  of many 
i n s t a l l a t ions  is  e i the r  suf f ic ien t ly  small as  t o  
require no correction o r  the calibration is  su f f i -  
c ien t ly  simple that corrections can be applied with 
calibration cards. For a i r c ra f t  operating a t  high 
subsonic speeds, however , the variation of the e r ror  
Kith Mach number and angle of attack i s  generally of 
such mamitude and complexity as t o  require correc- 
t i on  by automatic means. For supersonic f l i g h t ,  the 
fixed e r ror  of a fuselage-nose in s t a l l a t ion  w i l l  be 
smaller than that of any other conventional i n s t a l -  
l a t ion  ( r e f .  17).  
ence 18, even though the  e r ror  of t h i s  i n s t a l l a t ion  
may be small i n  terms of pressure, the corresponding 
er ror  i n  terms of a l t i t ude  will probably be of such 
magnitude as t o  require compensation. In a recent 
calibration of a fuselage-nose in s t a l l a t ion  on the 
X-15 airplane,  fo r  example, the static-pressure 
e r ror  a t  a Mach number of 3.1 was found t o  be only 
314 percent of the impact pressure but the  corre- 
sponding alt i tude e r ror  was 2,200 f ee t  ( r e f .  19). 
However, as noted i n  refer- 
The Variable Error 
The magnitude of the  variable e r ror  fo r  current 
a i r c r a f t  w a s  estimated by ICAO t o  increase from 
110 f ee t  a t  5,000 fee t  t o  250 f ee t  a t  30,000 f ee t  
and t o  remain a t  250 f ee t  fo r  a l t i tudes  up t o  
50,000 fee t .  
In an early investigation t o  determine the 
variable e r ror  for  a var ie ty  of c i v i l  and mili tary 
a i r c ra f t ,  96 airplanes representing 31 types were 
calibrated with pacer a i r c r a f t  as  the calibration 
reference ( r e f .  20). The r e su l t s  indicated tha t  a t  
a l t i tudes  of 10,000 and 15,000 fee t ,  the h T f e r -  . 
ences i n  the static-pressure e r rors  among airplanes 
of a type were within 100 f ee t  f o r  22 types, 
between 100 and x)O f ee t  f o r  8 types, and greater 
than 2QO f ee t  for  1 type. For most of the a i r c ra f t  
types, therefore, the variable e r rors  were within 
the ICAO estimates (130 fee t  a t  10,000 f ee t  and 
150 f ee t  at  15,000 f e e t ) .  
~n more recent t e s t s  of 16 mi l i ta ry  transports 
representing three a i r c r a f t  types ( r e f .  21), the 
variable e r rors ,  as  determined by a ground-camera 
technique, were found t o  be 35 f ee t  a t  10,000 f ee t  
fo r  one type a i r c ra f t ,  165 f ee t  a t  18,000 f ee t  for  
a second type, and 105 f ee t  a t  35,000 f ee t  fo r  a 
t h i r d  type. Since the  s ix  airplanes for  which the 
105-foot e r ror  w a s  determined were a l l  compara- 
t i ve ly  new, the variable e r ror  fo r  older airplanes 
of the same type would be expected t o  be larger;  
the 250-foot value estimated by ICAO fo r  an a l t i -  
tude of 35,000 f ee t  would, therefore, appear 
reasonable. 
In  another recent investigation of the  vari-  
able e r ror  i n  France ( r e f .  22), the r e su l t s  of 
t e s t s  of the  f i r s t  30 airplanes of a type a l so  con- 
firmed the  ICAO estimates. 
Calibration Methods 
Although estimates have been made of the re la -  
t i v e  accuracies of various methods f o r  the calibra- 
t i on  of static-pressure systems ( r e f .  23), compara- 
t i v e  data on the experimental accuracy of the  
methods currently being used a re  lacking. Both 
ICAO and IATA have, therefore,  expressed the need 
fo r  a universal method t o  which the  calibration of 
a l l  a i r c r a f t  could be referenced; a requirement was 
a l so  s ta ted  tha t  the method be simple enough fo r  
routine or periodic calibration checks. 
During the l a t t e r  par t  of 1962, the  FAA and 
the  NASA selected and conducted a f l i g h t  evaluation 
of a calibration method tha t  appeared t o  best  meet 
the  requirements of accuracy and reproducibil i ty 
demanded of a primary standard. 
p r i sed  two t e s t  procedures, namely, a ground- 
camera technique fo r  calibrations a t  low a l t i t udes  
and a ground-radar technique fo r  calibrations a t  
high a l t i tudes .  To determine the accuracy tha t  
could be achieved with these techniques, calibra- 
t i ons  of a j e t  transport  were conducted using the  
most precise instrumentation available ( r e f .  24). 
This method com- 
From the r e su l t s  of two f l i g h t s  a t  heights of 
about 500 f ee t  and two f l i g h t s  a t  heights of about 
25,ooO fee t ,  the standard deviation ( u )  of the data 
from both the  low- and the high-altitude t e s t s  was 
found t o  be about l/3 pound per square foot.  
a l t i t u d e  e r rors  corresponding t o  this pressure 
e r ro r  a re  4 f ee t  a t  sea l eve l  and 10 f ee t  at  
25,OOO fee t .  For these values of u and fo r  the 
t e s t  airspeeds f o r  which eight data points were 
obtained, the  mean of the  calibration i s  known, fo r  
a confidence l eve l  of 99 percent, t o  be within 
The 
l eve l  and 1.3 f ee t  a t  25,000 fee t .  
On the basis of these resu l t s ,  the instrumen- 
t a t ion  and techniques used i n  t h i s  investigation 
are considered suitable f o r  use as a primary stand- 
ard. 
regards radar cost and f l i g h t  time per data point, 
there i s  a need for  a simpler, l e s s  expensive method 
for  conducting routine calibration checks. Although 
the ground-camera technique can be used fo r  such 
.check calibrations ( a s  was done i n  the  investigation 
of r e f .  21), the method i s  not considered suf f i -  
c ien t ly  simple and f lex ib le  fo r  use by a i r c r a f t  
operators. Other methods are,  therefore, being 
evaluated by the  FAA i n  an attempt t o  f ind  an 
acceptable method tha t  can be used through a wide 
range of speed and a l t i t ude  and s t i l l  provide the  
precision required of a secondary standard. 
However, because the method is  expensive as 
Fl ight  Technical Errors 
For f l i g h t  under autopilot control, the f l i g h t  
technical e r ro r  was considered by UTA t o  depend on 
the  type of a i r c ra f t ,  the accuracy of the autopilot ,  
and atmospheric conditions ( r e f .  2).  
On the  bas i s  of a number of investigations of 
the f l i g h t  technical errors of c i v i l  a i r c r a f t  a t  
a l t i t udes  up t o  25,OoO fee t ,  ICAO concluded tha t  the 
e r rors  were normally distributed and tha t  a value of 
500 f ee t  could be assigned as a probable maximum 
value fo r  c i v i l  operations a t  a l t i tudes  up t o  
50,000 f ee t .  Since it was f e l t  t ha t  t h i s  f igure 
could be reduced by greater use of autopilots with 
height lock, an objective was s ta ted  fo r  reducing 
the e r ror  t o  values tha t  would range from 200 f ee t  
a t  5,000 f e e t  t o  325 f ee t  a t  50,000 fee t .  
During the past  year, the NASA reported an 
investigation of the f l i g h t  technical e r rors  of 
commercial transports operating under autopilot ,  
al t i tude-hold control a t  a l t i tudes  up t o  40,000 f ee t  
( r e f .  25). The data were obtained from 19 airplanes 
(including turbojet ,  turboprop, and piston-engine 
types) on 6,421 f l i gh t s  over a var ie ty  of routes 
including transoceanic. The e r rors  were determined 
from pressure-altitude recordings which were evalu- 
ated i n  terms of the percent of the  cruise time the 
airplanes flew a t  given a l t i t ude  deviations from 
t h e i r  cruise f l i g h t  levels.  
The a l t i t ude  deviations fo r  0.3-percent cruise 
time ( a  c r i t e r ion  suggested by the gg.'(-percent 
probabili ty of the Ja value of a normal distribu- 
t i on )  of the  19 airplanes are shown on figure 2 for  
each of the 5,000-foot-altitude brackets within 
which the data were collected. This figure shows 
tha t  the maximum value throughout the 40,000-foot 
range i s  250 f e e t  and tha t ,  fo r  most of the a i r -  
planes, the values are appreciably lower than those 
proposed by ICAO as  a desirable objective. 
An analysis of the d is t r ibu t ion  of the f l i g h t  
technical e r ro r s  of reference 25 showed the  e r rors  
t o  be random but not normally distributed. Because 
. o f  the nature of these distributions,  the a l t i t ude  
deviations a t  0.3-percent cruise time do not always 
rienced by many of the airplanes.  
although the  a l t i t ude  deviations f o r  0.3-percent 
cruise time of the ten  turboje t s  operating between 
25,000 and 40,000 f ee t  were 225 f ee t  o r  lower, the 
maximum deviations recorded on nine of the airplanes 
were i n  excess of 500 f ee t ;  fo r  four of the air- 
planes t h e  deviations were i n  excess of 1,000 fee t .  
Furthermore, these re la t ive ly  large deviations 
occurred more frequently than might be expected; fo r  
I r e f l ec t  the  much larger deviations tha t  were expe- 
For example, 
example, for  the 2,361 f l i g h t s  of the ten  turbo- 
jets,  over 250 deviations greater than 300 f ee t  
were recorded. Because of the magnitude and f re -  
quency of these large deviations, it would appear 
desirable t o  incorporate some form of a l t i tude-  
deviation monitoring device t o  a l e r t  the p i l o t  
whenever the deviation exceeded some specified 
value, fo r  example, 250 fee t .  
In  view of the  quantity of data collected i n  
the NASA investigation, the a l t i t ude  deviations 
determined from t h i s  study are  considered t o  be 
representative of those t o  be expected fo r  c i v i l  
transports under autopilot  altitude-hold control a t  
a l t i tudes  up t o  40,000 fee t .  Since the  a l t i t ude  
deviations f o r  mi l i ta ry  and general aviation a i r -  
c ra f t  may d i f f e r  from those of the c i v i l  transports,  
investigations of altitude-keeping performance of 
these a i r c r a f t  would be required before a complete 
assessment can be made of the f l i g h t  technical 
error. 
Combined Errors 
As noted ea r l i e r ,  the  system e r ro r  i s  the  com- 
bined value of the instrument and static-pressure 
errors and the alt imetry e r ror  i s  the  combined 
value of the system and f l i g h t  technical errors.  
Because of the  d i f f i cu l ty  of measuring e i the r  of 
the combined errors under ac tua l  operating condi- 
t ions,  attempts have been made t o  compute these 
errors by s t a t i s t i c a l  procedures. 
I n  the calculation of combined er rors  by ICAO 
and IATA ( r e f s .  1 and 2), each of the  individual 
errors (instrument , static-pressure , and f l i g h t  
technical) was assi@ed a probable maximum value 
and a type of e r ror  d i s t r ibu t ion .  The individual 
errors were then combined by the root-mean-square 
procedure t o  produce e i ther  a system er ror  or an 
altimetry e r ror  fo r  a single airplane. For an 
assessment of ve r t i ca l  separation standards, the 
altimetry errors of two airplanes were combined by 
the same procedure and the resu l tan t  e r ror  w a s  con- 
sidered t o  represent the loss i n  v e r t i c a l  separa- 
t ion tha t  would be equaled 3r exceeded 3 times i n  
1,000. 
System Error 
An investigation t o  determine the  sum of the  
system errors of two a i r c r a f t  under ac tua l  operating 
conditions was conducted by eleven a i r l i n e s  under 
the sponsorship of IATA i n  1963 ( r e f .  26). 
measurements were made during routine f l i g h t s  over 
the North Atlantic a t  a l t i t udes  above 29,000 fee t .  
The sum 02 the e r rors  was determined as the  d i f fe r -  
ence between the pressure-altitude separation and 
the actual height separation (as  measured by radio 
alt imeters) of any two a i r c r a f t  operating within 
specified space and time limits (e.g., common Ion- 
gitude within navigational accuracy l i m i t s ,  l a t e r a l  
separation within 112 degree of l a t i t ude ,  ve r t i ca l  
separation within 2,000 f ee t ,  and a time separation 
no greater than 1 hour). 
observations, the  sum of the  system er rors  of two 
a i r c r a f i  w a s  found t o  be normally d is t r ibu ted  and 
t o  have a 3a value of 5 l O  f ee t .  The r e l i a b i l i t y  
of t h i s  value is, of course, dependent on the  accu- 
racies of the radio alt imeters and on the degree of 
concurrency ( i n  terms of both time and posit ion) of 
the two pressure-altitude readings. 
The 
From 1,280 pa i r s  of 
For this 5lO-foot value fo r  two a i r c ra f t ,  the  
system er ror  fo r  a single a i r c r a f t ,  computed by the 
error-combining procedure used by ICAO and UTA, 
would be 360 feet. 
were obtained with both uncorrected and servo- 
corrected precision alt imeters,  only  a general com- 
parison can be made between t h i s  f l i g h t  value of 
360 fee t  and the estimates of system er rors  given 
i n  reference 1. For 811 a l t i t ude  of 35,000 f ee t  
( the  assumed average a l t i t ude  fo r  the f l i g h t  data), 
the 3a value of the system er ror  fo r  a system 
incorporating an uncorrected precision alt imeter 
was estimated in  reference 1 t o  be 342 fee t ;  fo r  a 
servo-corrected system, the e r ror  was estimated t o  
be 279 f e e t .  
Since the  f l i g h t  measurements 
Altimetry Errors 
In an assessment of ve r t i ca l  separation stand- 
ards i n  1960 (ref.  2),  IATA concluded tha t  
1,000-foot separations were safe and acceptable up 
t o  50,000 f ee t  for  a i r c ra f t  equipped with precision 
alt imeters o r  instruments with be t t e r  performance. 
This conclusion was based on the assumption that the 
fixed static-pressure e r ror  would be corrected (by 
calibration card) t o  a residual e r ror  of 50 fee t ,  
t ha t  the probable maximum values of the  variable 
static-pressure error would be those estimated by 
ICAO ( fo r  example, 250 f ee t  fo r  a l t i t udes  above 
30,000 f e e t ) ,  and that the f l i g h t  technical e r ror  
would have a probable maximum value of 500 f ee t .  
A l l  of the  errors were assumed t o  have a normal 
distribution except the residual e r ro r  of the 
static-pressure correction, which w a s  assumed t o  
have a rectangular distribution. 
For an a l t i tude  of 40,000 f ee t ,  the instrument 
When 
and static-pressure errors,  according t o  the UTA 
estimate, a re  249 and 264 f ee t ,  respectively. 
these e r rors  are combined with the m - f o o t  f l i gh t  
technical error, the  alt imetry e r ror  fo r  a single 
a i r c ra f t  becomes 618 fee t .  For two a i r c r a f t ,  the 
s t a t i s t i c a l  sum of the two alt imetry e r rors  would 
be 618 x fi o r  874 fee t .  Graphical representa- 
t ions  of the  distributions of these individual and 
combined errors a re  shown i n  figure 3a. If t he  
874-foot value is  considered as a measure of ve r t i -  
ca l  separation loss  within an assigned separation 
of 1,000 f ee t  (reduced by 50 f ee t  t o  account fo r  the 
ve r t i ca l  s ize  of t he  a i r c r a f t ) ,  the  ac tua l  separa- 
t ion  would be 76 fee t .  
In  contrast t o  t h i s  procedure of computing 
ve r t i ca l  separation loss from a s t a t i s t i c a l  summa- 
t ion  of two altimetry e r rors ,  the alt imetry e r rors  
of two a i r c ra f t  can also be re la ted  t o  a given sep- 
aration t o  provide another measure of operational 
safety, namely, co l l i s ion  probability. I n  ref-  
erence 27 it was shown tha t ,  i f  the altimetry-error 
distributions of two aircraft can be represented by 
normal curves and i f  the two curves are separated by 
an amount equal t o  the assigned separation, then, i f  
the a i r c r a f t  are located along a ve r t i ca l  l i ne ,  the 
probability of coll ision i s  determined by the  extent 
t o  which the  curves overlap and by the ve r t i ca l  
dimensions of the a i r c ra f t .  This procedure f o r  cal-  
culating coll ision probabi l i t i es  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  
figure 3b for  the same s e t  of values used i n  f ig-  
ure 3a ( i . e . ,  altimetry errors of 618 f ee t ,  a i r c r a f t  
dimensions of 50 f ee t ,  and an assigned separation of 
1,000 f e e t ) .  For t h i s  case, the co l l i s ion  probabil- 
i t y  was calculated t o  be 192/1,000,000. This, then, 
i s  the coll ision probabili ty tha t  would apply (along 
a ve r t i ca l  l ine)  when the  actual separation, tal- 
culated by the ver t ica l  separation-loss procedure, 
i s  76 fee t .  
To indicate the manner i n  which co l l i s ion  
probabili ty varies with alt imetry e r ror ,  additional 
calculations were made f o r  the case of two a i r c r a f t  
having ve r t i ca l  dimensions of 50 f ee t  and an 
ass imed separation of 1,000 fee t .  
these calculations are p lo t ted  i n  figure 4, which 
shows the co l l i s ion  probabili ty t o  be near zero fo r  
alt imetry e r rors  up t o  400 fee t ,  t o  increase t o  
10/1,000,000 a t  an altimetry e r ror  of 500 f ee t  and - 
t o  increase thereaf te r  at  a very rapid r a t e  fo r  
alt imetry errors greater than 500 f ee t .  It should 
be emphasized tha t  these values of co l l i s ion  proba- 
b i l i t y  are re la t ive  and tha t  the ac tua l  probabili- 
t i e s  of co l l i s ion  would be lower i f  account could 
be taken of l a t e r a l  and longitudinal separations. 
From a consideration of the f l i g h t  technical 
The r e su l t s  of 
e r rors  determined i n  the NASA investigation (which 
showed the a l t i t ude  deviations fo r  0.3-percent 
cruise time t o  be considerably lower than the 
500-foot value assumed i n  the UTA analysis),  it 
might appear t ha t  alt imetry e r rors  of 500 f ee t  or 
l e s s  can be realized with present-day equipment. 
To examine t h i s  poss ib i l i ty ,  calculations have 
been made of an alt imetry e r ror  based on (1) a 
f l i g h t  technical e r ror  of 225 f ee t  ( t he  highest 
value determined i n  the NASA investigation fo r  the 
a l t i t ude  range of 25,000 t o  40,000 f e e t ) ,  (2)  a 
servo-correction system er ror  of 0.2-percent a l t i -  
tude (assumed t o  have a normal d is t r ibu t ion  and t o  
be applicable t o  both the i n s t m e n t  e r ror  and the  
fixed static-pressure e r ro r ) ,  and (3) the ICAO 
assumed value fo r  the  variable e r ror  of the s t a t i c -  
pressure system. 
( f o r  which the residual e r ror  of the servo- 
correction system i s  &I f ee t  and the variable 
static-pressure e r ror  i s  250 f e e t ) ,  the  system 
er ror  would be 262 fee t .  
For an a l t i t ude  of 40,000 fee t  
Since the f l i g h t  technical e r rors  determined 
i n  the  NASA investigation were not normally d i s t r ib -  
uted, they cannot be combined with the  3a value 
of a normally d is t r ibu ted  system er ror  by the s ta -  
t i s t i c a l  summation procedure used by ICAO and UTA. 
A s  an a l te rna te ,  and more conservative, approach, 
the  two er rors  have been added d i rec t ly  ( a s  indi-  
cated i n  f ig .  5 fo r  two a i r c r a f t  having an assigned 
separation of 1,000 f e e t )  t o  produce an alt imetry 
e r ro r  of 487 fee t .  
Since the  probabili ty t h a t  the  system er ror  
w i l l  be e i ther  plus o r  minus 262 f ee t  i s  1.5/1,000, 
the probabili ty tha t  the ac tua l  f l i g h t  leve ls  of 
the  two airplanes w i l l  each be displaced by 262 f ee t  
and i n  directions t o  reduce separation i s  
2/1,000,000. Similarly, since an a l t i t ude  deviation 
of 225 f ee t  e i the r  above o r  below the  ac tua l  f l i g h t  
l eve l  would occur fo r  0.15 percent of the  cruise 
time, deviations of 225 f ee t  by both of the a i r c r a f t  
i n  directions t o  reduce the  separation would occur 
f o r  0.0002 percent of the  cruise times of the  two 
a i r c r a f t .  
From a consideration of (1) the low probabili ty 
of the  two f l i g h t  leve ls  being displaced from the 
assigned a l t i t udes  by 262 f e e t  i n  directions t o  
reduce separation and (2)  the low percent of t h e i r  
c ru ise  times t h a t  t he  two a i r c r a f t  would each devi- 
a t e  by an additional 225 f ee t  i n  directions t o  fUr- 
t h e r  reduce the  separation, it would appear tha t  
t he  co l l i s ion  exposure time fo r  the  two a i r c r a f t  
would be extremely small. 
l i s i o n  occurrence, however, would be even smaller, 
The probabili ty of a col- 
since such a condition would require tha t  the  a l t i -  
tude deviations of the two a i r c r a f t  occur over t he  
same point ( i . e . ,  with zero horizontal separation). 
On the assumption tha t  these values for  the 
system er ror  and the f l i gh t  technical e r ror  are 
t ru ly  representative of the operational accuracies 
tha t  can be achieved with currently available 
-instrumFnts, autopilots,  and a i r c ra f t ,  it would 
appear t ha t  a high degree of operational safety can 
be realized within 1,000-foot ve r t i ca l  separations 
a t  a l t i t udes  up t o  40,000 f ee t .  
of the  large excursions from f l i g h t  leve l  t ha t  were 
encountered when the a l t i t ude  deviations f o r  
0.3-percent cruise time were 225 f ee t  o r  less ,  it 
would appear t h a t  t h i s  degree of safety w i l l  be 
realized only i f  the  a i r c r a f t  are equipped with 
altitude-deviation warning devices t o  insure tha t  
the f l i g h t  technical e r rors  a re  kept within limits 
approximating the  ZPj-foot value assumed i n  t h i s  
analysis. 
However, i n  view 
Need For Further Work 
From the foregoing review of alt imetry devel- 
opments, it i s  apparent t ha t  significant progress 
has been made i n  recent years. However, the need 
f o r  fur ther  e f fo r t s  i n  some areas has a l so  been 
indicated. 
With regard t o  static-pressure measurements, 
fo r  example, there is a need t o  develop a simple 
and precise calibration method and t o  establish an 
in te rna t iona l  standard t o  which the  calibrations of 
a l l  a i r c r a f t  can be referenced. The development of 
such a method would provide more accurate correc- 
t i ons  fo r  the  static-pressure e r rors  of individual 
a i r c r a f t  and would permit the  accumulation of infor- 
mation on the  variable e r ror  of the  static-pressure 
systems of large numbers of a i r c ra f t .  
I 
There i s  a l so  a need f o r  collecting data on 
the  f l i g h t  technical e r rors  of mili tary and general 
aviation a i r c r a f t .  Because of the  large a l t i t ude  
deviations which have been found t o  occur with air- 
c r a f t  on autopilot  altitude-hold control, a need 
fo r  an alt i tude-deviation monitoring and warning 
device has a l so  been indicated. 
Finally,  there  i s  a need t o  improve the  main- 
tenance prac t ices  and t o  standardize the  equipment 
and procedures r e l a t ing  t o  the  routine tes t ing  and 
in s t a l l a t ion  of the instruments. 
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